Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended Conscious Mind by Kirchhoff, Michael D & Kiverstein, Julian
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities 
- Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
January 2020 
Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended 
Conscious Mind 
Michael D. Kirchhoff 
University of Wollongong, kirchhof@uow.edu.au 
Julian Kiverstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/asshpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Kirchhoff, Michael D. and Kiverstein, Julian, "Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the 
Extended Conscious Mind" (2020). Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities - Papers. 188. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/asshpapers/188 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended Conscious 
Mind 
Abstract 
Copyright 2020 Kirchhoff and Kiverstein. It is a near consensus among materialist philosophers of mind 
that consciousness must somehow be constituted by internal neural processes, even if we remain unsure 
quite how this works. Even friends of the extended mind theory have argued that when it comes to the 
material substrate of conscious experience, the boundary of skin and skull is likely to prove somehow to 
be privileged. Such arguments have, however, typically conceived of the constitution of consciousness in 
synchronic terms, making a firm separation between proximate mechanisms and their ultimate causes. 
We argue that the processes involved in the constitution of some conscious experiences are diachronic, 
not synchronic. We focus on what we call phenomenal attunement in this paper-the feeling of being at 
home in a familiar, culturally constructed environment. Such a feeling is missing in cases of culture 
shock. Phenomenal attunement is a structure of our conscious experience of the world that is ubiquitous 
and taken for granted. We will argue that it is constituted by cycles of embodied and world-involving 
engagement whose dynamics are constrained by cultural practices. Thus, it follows that an essential 
structure of the conscious mind, the absence of which profoundly transforms conscious experience, is 
extended. 
Publication Details 
Kirchhoff, M. & Kiverstein, J. (2020). Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended 
Conscious Mind. Frontiers in Psychology, 11 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/asshpapers/188 
fpsyg-11-01966 August 19, 2020 Time: 20:13 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
















This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 29 February 2020
Accepted: 15 July 2020
Published: 21 August 2020
Citation:
Kirchhoff MD and Kiverstein J
(2020) Attuning to the World:




Attuning to the World: The
Diachronic Constitution of the
Extended Conscious Mind
Michael D. Kirchhoff1* and Julian Kiverstein2
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia, 2 Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam
University Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
It is a near consensus among materialist philosophers of mind that consciousness must
somehow be constituted by internal neural processes, even if we remain unsure quite
how this works. Even friends of the extended mind theory have argued that when it
comes to the material substrate of conscious experience, the boundary of skin and skull
is likely to prove somehow to be privileged. Such arguments have, however, typically
conceived of the constitution of consciousness in synchronic terms, making a firm
separation between proximate mechanisms and their ultimate causes. We argue that the
processes involved in the constitution of some conscious experiences are diachronic,
not synchronic. We focus on what we call phenomenal attunement in this paper—
the feeling of being at home in a familiar, culturally constructed environment. Such a
feeling is missing in cases of culture shock. Phenomenal attunement is a structure of
our conscious experience of the world that is ubiquitous and taken for granted. We
will argue that it is constituted by cycles of embodied and world-involving engagement
whose dynamics are constrained by cultural practices. Thus, it follows that an essential
structure of the conscious mind, the absence of which profoundly transforms conscious
experience, is extended.
Keywords: extended consciousness, extended mind, cultural practices, diachronic constitution, ultimate
explanation, proximate explanation
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we set out to defend the thesis of the extended conscious mind (ECM). We do
so because we take it that the mind in general is first and foremost widely and diachronically
constituted. The vast majority of what humans think and experience unfolds over time
through bouts of situated engagement with the environment. This does not just hold for
unconscious problem solving as many leading exponents of extended mind theory are disposed
to argue. These philosophers will happily concede that some of our unconscious cognition
is accomplished by cycles of perception and action in which the cognizer makes active use
of resources located in the environment around them (see, e.g., Clark and Chalmers, 1998;
Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Sutton et al., 2010; Wheeler, 2010; Kirchhoff, 2012; Kiverstein,
2018). Most of these philosophers have, however, been unwilling to generalize such arguments
to consciousness (see, e.g., Chalmers, 2008, 2019; Clark, 2009, 2012). They have argued
that when it comes to consciousness the boundary of the skin and skull will somehow
turn out to be privileged and special. Others have conceded that in some sense ECM is
possible (Wheeler, 2015). But they have claimed that specific arguments for ECM have thus
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far failed to make a convincing case that consciousness actually
does extend. They claim that our best sciences of consciousness
make it highly likely that consciousness will turn out to be
a purely “in-the-head,” brain-based phenomenon (Clark, 2009;
Wheeler, 2015).
We argue, by contrast, that there are no good grounds for
setting up a divide between unconscious cognition and conscious
perceptual experience. What is good for the goose (extended
unconscious cognition) is also good for the gander (extended
conscious experience). The boundary of skin and skull has no
special properties such that only the processes that fall within
this boundary have what it takes to support conscious experience.
The cognitive agent is what Susan Hurley called a dynamical
singularity—one that forms out of a field of causal flows, some
of which loop out into the world through cycles of perception
and action (Hurley, 1998). Thus, the boundary of the conscious
mind can, in the right kind of circumstances, form in an agent’s
dynamical coupling with its environment.
In what follows, we restrict our argument to a
phenomenological structure of everyday lived experience
we term “phenomenal attunement”—the feeling of being at
home in a familiar culturally constructed environment. This
phenomenological structure forms in the co-constituting
coupling of the human agent with its social and cultural
environment. We talk of the “co-constitution” of agent
and environment because we will argue both agent and
environment form together. The individual’s cognitive capacities
are partially constituted by environmental structures, practices,
and institutions. At the same time, these structures, practices
and institutions are the product of human cultural activities.
There is no end point in the process leading to the experience
of phenomenal attunement after which the individual can
throw away the cultural environment and rely solely upon the
brain. Since phenomenal attunement is a structure of conscious
experience, this will provide us with an argument for why the
person’s conscious experience cannot always be generated solely
out of processes unfolding inside the person’s brain, uncoupled
from the surrounding environment. The cultural environment
plays a constituting role because we get to experience only
phenomenal attunement (and its corollary of phenomenal
disattunement) in our ongoing co-constituting coupling with a
social and culturally constructed niche.
Internalist critics of ECM will be quick to insist (mistakenly,
we believe) that internalism is entirely consistent with this line of
argument. They will most likely object that the brain is causally
dependent on specific forms of agent-environment couplings to
settle on the pattern of neural activity constitutive of a particular
conscious experience (see, e.g., Adams and Aizawa, 2001; Rupert,
2009). Internalists will concede that the world plays an ongoing
causal role in driving the brain into a certain neural configuration
allowing for the emergence of conscious experience. But they will
insist it is the particular neural configuration in question that
materially constitutes the conscious experience (see also Clark,
2009; Wheeler, 2015). They will thus take issue with our talk of
co-constituting coupling of agent and environment.
We address this objection directly by arguing that it rests
on a misunderstanding of the distinction between causation
and constitution, treating one as strictly diachronic (causation)
and the other as wholly synchronic (constitution). The
constitution relation is generally cast as a strictly non-causal (i.e.,
atemporal/synchronic) one of dependence. We argue (building
on Kirchhoff, 2015b and Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019a) such
an understanding of constitution while appropriate for material
objects, is ill-suited when it comes to characterizing dynamic
and processual phenomena such as conscious experience. To
adequately characterize the constitution of a process, it is both
possible and fruitful to understand the concept of constitution
as a diachronic relation of dependence. The notion of diachronic
constitution we argue leads naturally to an extended account
of phenomenal attunement, incorporating both ultimate and
proximate causes.1
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section “The
Diachronic Constitution of Phenomenal Attunement: The Case
of Culture Shock,” we start by explaining what we mean by
phenomenal attunement. We illustrate this phenomenon by
reference to the cases of culture shock and psychopathology
in which it is disturbed. We argue that culture shock
shows how the experience of being attuned to the cultural
environment is an integral part of the phenomenology of our
everyday conscious experiences. But phenomenal attunement
is also constitutively dependent on the ongoing coupling of
an individual to her cultural environment through cycles of
perception and action. Thus, phenomenal attunement provides
us with a case that illustrates how coupling to the cultural
environment diachronically constitutes a core dimension of
conscious experience. Section “Assembling the Mind: Cognitive
Assembly and The Pac-Man Intuition” takes up a likely internalist
objection to our argument. Arguments for the extended
mind have tended to limit bouts of extended cognition to
short, synchronic timescales. We argue that this focus on the
synchronic is problematic, as it precludes dynamical processes
unfolding over longer periods of time, from being more than
ultimate (background) causes against which the brain assembles
the elements that make up extended minds. We propose a
new metaphysics of constitution, cast in terms of diachronic
constitution that avoids this consequence. In section “Synchronic
and Diachronic Constitution,” we review the standard notion of
constitution (synchronic constitution), which we then contrast
with the diachronic conception of constitution required for
understanding the constitution of dynamic processes. We suggest
that the diachronic conception of constitution is required
1Others have defended positions on consciousness closely related to the extended
mind view we develop in this paper. Ward (2012), for example, does so by
appealing to personal-level considerations about the phenomenology of experience
and what such considerations might tell us about the sub-personal level machinery
involved in the constitution of consciousness. Others, like Noë (2004, 2009), appeal
to active sensorimotor engagement with the environment to make their case (see
also Hurley, 1998; Rowlands, 2010). Cosmelli and Thompson (2010) have argued
for the constitutive dependence of consciousness on the non-neural body and
world by calling into question brain-in-vat intuitions. Northoff (2019) can also
be read as arguing for an account of consciousness as partially constituted by
factors beyond the brain. Our argument will, however, differ from these important
exponents of ECM. We argue for the constitutive dependence of conscious
experience on cycles of perception and action that couple a person to his or her
cultural environment. We base our argument for the extendedness of phenomenal
attunement on a diachronic account of constitution.
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to account for the metaphysics of extended minds. This is
because extended cognition is dynamic, unfolding over time
through cycles of situated engagement with the affordances or
possibilities for action the environment furnishes (Anderson
et al., 2012; Kiverstein, 2018). In section “Objections: Pluggability
Intuitions, Free-Floating Brains and Internal Fantasies,” we
provide responses to three objections against our argument for
ECM. These objections aim to defend the consensus view among
materialist philosophers of mind that all experiences must be
somehow constituted out of internal neuronal processing. In
section “Wide and Diachronic Constitution: Two Conceptual
Flips,” we tackle the often made objection that arguments for the
extended mind (EM) are guilty of conflating causal coupling with
the metaphysical relation of constitution. We argue that once one
makes the turn to diachronic constitution, this objection against
EM, and by extension ECM, loses its force. We end section “Wide
and Diachronic Constitution: Two Conceptual Flips,” by showing
how the diachronic view of constitution we argue for in this paper
can safely avoid the cognitive bloat objection often raised against
EM (see, e.g., Rowlands, 2009; Sprevak, 2009).
THE DIACHRONIC CONSTITUTION OF
PHENOMENAL ATTUNEMENT: THE
CASE OF CULTURE SHOCK
As an illustration of what we mean by phenomenal attunement,
we will begin by considering the example of culture shock.
An experience of culture shock is characterized by feelings of
distress and alienation. These feelings of distress and alienation
are examples of an absence of phenomenal attunement with the
cultural environment. A much-discussed case is 13-year-old Eva
Hoffman, who, along with her mother and father, left Poland in
1956 for the prospects of a better life in Vancouver, Canada. Even
though Eva had her parents by her side, her experiential world
changed dramatically. She explains:
[T]he country of my childhood lives within me with a primacy that
is a form of love . . .. It has fed me language, perceptions, sounds. . ..
It has given me the colors and the furrows of reality, my first loves
(Hoffman, 1989, pp. 74–5; quoted in Wexler, 2008, p. 175).
Having spent only three nights in Vancouver, she reports
waking up from a dream, wondering:
[W]hat has happened to me in this new world? I don’t know. I don’t
see what I’ve seen, don’t comprehend what’s in front of me. I’m not
filled with language anymore, and I have only a memory of fullness
to anguish me with the knowledge that, in this dark and empty
state, I don’t really exist (Hoffman, 1989, p. 180; quoted in Wexler,
2008, p. 175).
Culture shock illustrates how expectations that have their
origin outside of the individual in patterns of cultural practices
attune us to a shared cultural environment. Should the individual
move to a new environment, the result may be misalignment and
pervasive, hard-to-suppress violation of her expectations about
her shared social and cultural environment. We will argue that to
properly explain cases such as culture shock we need to appeal
to an extended dynamic singularity comprising Eva’s internal
neurobiological states, the patterns of practice that are enacted
within her cultural niche, and her sensory and active states that
couple her to her cultural environment. To explain her current
experiences one must take into account the expectations that she
has formed through her past involvement in cultural practices
and the role of these expectations in shaping the phenomenology
of her ongoing experience. It is not just her past that we need
to take into account but also her present circumstances and her
orientation to the future in her new cultural environment.
Phenomenal attunement can be formalized as the divergence
between prior expectations about the causes of sensory
observations and the actual causes (e.g., generated via patterns of
cultural practice). The experience of phenomenal attunement can
be described as the Kullback–Leibler divergence between prior
expectations (P∗) and cultural practices (Po) generating sensory
states: Cexp = DKL [P∗ || Po].2 Phenomenal attunement comes in
degrees and varies with divergence between P∗ and Po. There
is an experience of phenomenal lack of attunement when DKL
[P∗ || Po] > 0. On average, one would expect expectations to
converge on cultural practices, ensuring phenomenal attunement
to one’s cultural environment. Suppose, now, that we associate
experiences of culture shock (feelings of distress and alienation)
with uncertainty; then the higher the divergence between P∗ and
Po, the more uncertainty is expressed in the coupling between P∗
and Po. Crucially, if there is high uncertainty as a consequence
of the divergence between P∗ and Po, the subject will need to
exert more effort to make sense of her surroundings. If one’s
expectations systematically fail to align with the regularities
(causal and statistical) of one’s environment, feelings of distress
are likely to arise as one needs to make much more effort to make
sense of how one finds oneself situated in the world.
We are all familiar with such situations, where uncertainty
about outcomes of social interactions yield sensations of
frustration or discontent. Alignment and continued attunement
to other people and to wider patterns of practice are integral parts
of the phenomenology of our everyday conscious experiences.
Slaby (2016) invites us to imagine working as an intern in a large
company:
Your first days working in the firm will be marked by experiences
like the following: You find the regular employees speaking, acting,
moving, and comporting themselves in ways that are unfamiliar
to you in various ways. Not only will their work routines be
new to you, but also their styles of interacting, of comporting
themselves, of resonating affectively with one another, the ways of
address, of conversing with superiors, the use of humor to begin
a conversation, or deflate a moment of tension, when and how to
2KL-divergence is a part of the formal tools used for modeling consciousness in
terms of belief or expectation updating schemes such as predictive processing in
cognitive neuroscience (Hohwy, 2012; Clark, 2016; Friston, 2018; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein, 2019a). It might be objected that this alignment between P∗ and sensory
states with cultural practices can be explained from entirely inside of the brain. The
remainder of our paper is devoted to explaining why we think such an objection is
mistaken. See also Northoff (2019) for an account of why KL-divergence (which he
understands in terms of variational free energy) is best interpreted in environment-
involving terms (and Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019a for a book-length treatment
of the extended conscious mind cast in terms of active inference and predictive
processing).
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display certain feelings openly (enthusiasm maybe, or pride after an
achievement), or suppressing others (no fear, no insecurities), and
so on (Slaby, 2016, p. 1).
As an intern you initially experience a phenomenal lack of
attunement to others in the workplace. So much of what takes
place between colleagues in a large corporation is the enactment
of a past history of interaction to which outsiders are not privy.
To align and adjust to this novel niche, an intern will need to
become familiar with what other employees take for granted.
She must learn more than how to perform her work routine.
She must cultivate a sense of how to interact with her colleagues
and what is at issue in these interactions. As long as she does
not have a sense of this, she will experience just the same or
similar feelings of distress and alienation associated with culture
shock. Perception and action in social domains such as a large
corporation are organized by norm-regulated practices—regular,
stable, and ordered patterns of activity. Norms structure social
interactions within a social domain. One must become attuned
to the norms that govern interactions in domains of social life in
order to feel at home in these domains of social life.
Thus, maintaining attunement with one’s cultural
surroundings critically depends on a match in an individual’s
expectations and the normatively regulated expectations of
other participants in a social practice (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein,
2019a, ch. 5).3 The expectations that guide one’s perception and
action must match the expectations that form in patterns of
practice. Pervasive and sustained lack of attunement can prove
to be pathological. People suffering from schizophrenic delusion
have been hypothesized to have a high expectation of noise and
uncertainty. They expect more sensory noise than there really
is in a given context with the consequence that they are unable
to find the signal among the noise. This leads them to neglect
sensory evidence in favor of their prior expectations (Fletcher
and Frith, 2009; Hohwy, 2015). The effect of this aberrant
weighting of evidence and general failure of context-sensitive
updating of prior expectations is that they come to inhabit a
delusional reality that is increasingly cut off and removed from
the common-sense, everyday, familiar reality they share with
other people (Sass, 1994). They increasingly come to inhabit
their own solipsistic reality. People with autism by contrast give
too much weight to new sensory evidence. This weighting of
sensory evidence leads to sensory information that conflicts with
their prior expectations to dominate in processing, which has the
consequence that they have difficulties in becoming attuned to
more stable and persistent regularities (Pellicano and Burr, 2012;
Lawson et al., 2014; Palmer et al., 2017). The consequence of this
3In neural dynamical terms, we can think of attunement with respect to generalized
synchrony of the large-scale internal dynamics of the brain with the external
dynamics of the cultural environment. A simple example of generalized synchrony
is entrainment of the sort that happens when one finds one tapping one’s foot
along to the rhythm of music one is listening to. Northoff (2019) suggests that
in perception the temporal-spatial dynamics of the brain synchronize with, and
thus conform to, the world’s external dynamics, while in action it is the other
way around: the world’s external dynamics conforms to the brain’s internal
dynamics (c.f. Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Bruineberg et al., 2018; Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein, 2019a, ch. 4). Northoff makes a more general argument for ECM
on the basis of these kinds of considerations. We restrict our focus here to arguing
for the extension of phenomenal attunement.
aberrant weighting of sensory information in both cases is that
people have difficulties in becoming phenomenally attuned to
non-autistic cultural practices.4
In culture shock this attunement to the everyday world is
also temporarily lost, and this leads to a deep disturbance of
lived experience with the divergence between P∗ and Po being
high. Crucially, attunement, as well as lack of attunement, relies
on the ongoing coupling of Eva to the cultural world through
cycles of perception and action. Phenomenal attunement is, as we
have suggested, the outcome of synchronous coupling between
internal and external states mediated via sensory and active states
(c.f. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019a). The person is coupled to
her cultural environment by sensory and active states. Patterns
of practice structure what we expect to experience in our cultural
environment. Repeated engagement in these practices establishes
the norms and rules of conduct that push back should one
deviate from them. Think of Slaby’s example of the workplace
practices and patterns of micro-interaction in a large corporation.
Roepstorff et al. (2012) state: “Culture gets under the skin and
skull, . . . and it is remade gradually through collective instances
of actualization” (p. 1052). This normatively regulated coupling
plays a constituting role in the generation of conscious experience
of phenomenal attunement or lack of attunement.
Phenomenal attunement is not constituted synchronically
by underlying brain states at a snapshot instant in time. If
conscious experience is equal to the Kullback–Leibler divergence
between prior expectations (P∗) and cultural practices (Po)
generating sensory states, Cexp = DKL [P∗ || Po], then attunement
cannot be constituted by the proximate mechanisms involved
in generating P∗. The KL-divergence is a relational measure of
the distance between P∗ and Po. An individual agent’s coupling
to a culturally constructed environment is best understood
diachronically, not synchronically. The individual’s activities
are constrained by the norms that govern the regular and
ordered patterns of activities that stabilize in a community over
time. Thus, the experience of phenomenal lack of attunement
that arises from failing to become adequately attuned to the
cultural environment is best understood in terms of dynamical
processes that unfold over multiple interacting timescales. In
other words, it is best understood diachronically. Let us unpack
this argument step by step.
We have analyzed Eva’s experience of culture shock in terms of
expectations P∗ formed out of her involvement in past practices
associated with her childhood in Warsaw that fail to align with
the cultural environment she now inhabits in Vancouver. The
cycles of perception and action that couple her to her cultural
surroundings are “permeated” and “infused” by her expectations
(Gallagher, 2018; Hutto et al., 2019). Her expectations provide
her with a background understanding of her surroundings in
virtue of which she encounters a familiar environment in which
she knows how to act. Think again of our example of the office
4Krueger and Maiese (2018, p. 28) have noted that a key challenge people on the
autism spectrum face is becoming attuned to the norms and expectations of non-
autistic “neurotypicals,” which are often “unspoken, highly context-specific and
communicated by way of nuanced body language.” They go on to write that “high-
functioning” people with autism often find it easy to become attuned to each other
since their interactions are governed by “autism-friendly” norms and expectations.
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intern who is yet to be initiated into the styles of interacting taken
for granted by other employees. Eva’s expectations, however, fail
to align with the normative expectations regulative of people’s
activity in Vancouver. It is these expectations that she brings to
bear to make sense of her present situation and to orient how she
engages with her surroundings in the future. However, they fail
to orient her adequately to the normative expectations operative
in her current environment. The result of this lack of alignment
is her experience of phenomenal lack of attunement.
Those in the grip of internalist intuitions might agree with
us that patterns of cultural practices are involved in setting
the parameters of brain-based processes over long (ultimate)
timescales. Yet they will insist that in the here and now, conscious
experience is determined entirely by proximate mechanisms in
the brain unconsciously inferring hypotheses about the hidden
external causes of sensory data. To insist otherwise would be
to fallaciously confuse ultimate causes with proximate ones in
an explanation of consciousness. Our objector might attempt
to bolster such intuitions by invoking neural duplicates. Would
Eva’s neural duplicate in the present moment not have the same
phenomenal experience as Eva just now? This objection turns
on the idea that it is the neural machinery and the particular
forms of information processing it supports that do the work of
constituting the conscious mind synchronically, not a history of
interaction with the environment. We show why we think such
an objection is misplaced in the next section.
ASSEMBLING THE MIND: COGNITIVE
ASSEMBLY AND THE PAC-MAN
INTUITION
The debate about the extended mind (EM) really took off in
the philosophy of mind with the publication of a short paper in
Analysis by Clark and Chalmers (1998). The aim of the paper
was to invite readers to question the (biological chauvinist)
assumption that anything located external to skin and skull
cannot be a part of a person’s mind. Clark and Chalmers (1998)
devised much discussed thought experiments aimed at showing
how something is a part of a person’s mind because of the
causal role it plays in guiding the person’s behavior. Artifacts,
such as notebooks located outside of the individual’s body,
can become fully integrated parts of an individual’s thinking
processes. By coupling with tools and technologies the individual
can accomplish her thinking and problem solving. Thus, artifacts
can form a part of a larger cognitive system the individual relies
upon in acting. They can come to play a constitutive role in the
production of the individual’s behavior equivalent to that played
by processes internal to the individual. Clark and Chalmers
(1998) argued that we should not exclude the things around us
from counting as parts of our minds simply because of their
location outside of the head; rather, if external elements play the
right kind of functional role in driving cognitive processes, such
elements should count as part of someone’s mind—just as internal
states playing such roles would naturally qualify as part of one’s
mental machinery.
Clark in his later work was up-front about giving a privileged
place to the agent in the assembly or formation of extended
cognitive processes (Clark, 2008). He writes: “Human cognitive
processing (sometimes) literally extends into the environment
surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the
organism, the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the
most active element” (p. 139). The individual cognizer decides,
in part based on efficiency considerations, whether to rely solely
on her own on-board (neural) cognitive machinery to solve
a problem or to softly assemble a solution that makes use of
resources located in the external environment. The work of
assembling a cognitive system that can solve a particular problem
is delegated to the brain of the individual. Problem solving may
sometimes constitutively involve bouts of situated, real-world
action that unfolds over relatively short timescales of hundreds
of milliseconds, or seconds, and is orchestrated from inside of
the brain of the individual. Insofar as Clark takes cognition to
be organism-centered, he must insist upon a strict separation of
events as they unfold over short timescales from events as they
unfold in cultural practice over longer historical timescales. But
many examples of situated action in the literature are examples
of actions the person has learned to perform by taking part in
cultural practices (Hutchins, 2011). Whereas Clark will argue it
is the brain that does the work of assembling and organizing
the cognitive system in these cases, we would argue (taking our
lead from the cognitive anthropologist Ed Hutchins) that in many
cases cultural practices organize the action in situated action and
therefore in cognitive assembly.
The patterns of perception and action belong to a cultural
practice because the understanding of what to say and what
to do derives from rules, evaluative standards, principles, and
imperatives that are operative in practice. Practices organize
what people do in the sense that the tasks and projects people
undertake and the purposes and ends for which people act have
their origin in practices (Schatzki, 1996). What the members
of a practice say and do follows from and aligns with the
practice. Think again of Slaby’s example of the intern working
in a large corporation. Employees are trained to think, feel,
and act so that they can become attuned to playing a specific
role within the corporate machine. People already habituated
to working in the company will reinforce and sanction or
punish what the intern says and does in more or less subtle
ways until what she says and does is well aligned with the
prevalent styles of interaction in this institution. Individuals
are situated in practices, but the practices also situate what
individuals do and say. Clark and Chalmers (1998) put forward
the hypothesis of the extended mind starting from a picture in
which a pre-existing individual agent occasionally connects with
the world to solve a problem that it would be much harder
to solve without the use of some artifact, tool, or technology.
We are arguing for a view of the extended mind in which
the activities of the individual agent and the agent’s cultural
environment are quite literally co-constituting. The individual
isn’t already fully formed but what the individual says and
does is profoundly shaped and transformed by the practices
they take part in.
Clark is willing to allow that cultural practices may do some of
the work of setting the scene for the assembly and orchestration of
extended cognitive processes. However, he stops short of allowing
cultural practices to form a part of the slow unfolding processes
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out of which extended minds form. Clark concedes what no
doubt everyone will allow—that a child must have learned to
read and write before she can make use of pen and paper to do
multiplication. However, he argues that when the child makes
use of the external scaffolding of pen and paper to do long
multiplication, she does so over relatively short time scales. But
why does Clark privilege processes unfolding in the synchronic
here and now? What the child is doing in making use of pen
and paper is reenacting what she has learned by taking part
in a practice. The actions she performs are embedded in and
organized by the practice of which she is a part. History and
culture are always embedded as well as carried along in the
practices and artifacts individuals are engaging with (Menary,
2007, 2010; Sutton, 2010; see also Haugeland, 2002). The result
of focusing only on the synchronic timescale—i.e., on proximate
causes—is that everything that makes a difference outside of
the here and now must be treated at best as making a causal
contribution to mentality, either as background conditions or as
input to internal neural processes.
Clark’s reasoning has the problematic consequence that minds
must be fully constituted over short-term timescales.5 History
and culture form background conditions that set the stage for
the brain to do the real work of constituting the mind in
the here and now. This wrongly assumes that all of the work
of cultural practices in constraining, coordinating, and self-
organizing action can come to be fully internalized. Clark seems
to assume that what is learned from others through training
in social practices can simply be internalized in the form of
internal representations. This training can then get to do its
work through its internal representation by the individual. The
cultural transmission of knowledge and practices is understood
as transmission of information among individuals. Once the
information has circulated in the right way among individuals,
there is no longer any work left for cultural practices to do.
We think this is the wrong model of how cultural learning
works. To see what is mistaken in this picture, consider by way
of analogy an individual we will call Pac-Man, named after the
character in the arcade game. Evolution has set up Pac-Man
so that on average and over time he distills the regularities of
his niche. He “eats” up such regularities and comes to embody
them in an internal model of his external environment. Pac-
Man moves about his environment, extracting and consuming
statistical structures to build up a detailed internal model of his
local environment. This is how he learns about his niche. The
body of Pac-Man and the wider niche in which he is situated are
ultimately important for acquiring and updating the parameters
of his internal model. Yet once these parameters are acquired,
Pac-Man can rely on his internally encoded model of his world
to act adaptively in his environment. He has consumed all of the
information he needs. We will call this the Pac-Man intuition.
5Note, we are not questioning that problem solving may take this form, assembled
and unfolding over synchronic timescales in the here and now. The point we are
objecting to is that by limiting the assembly of even extended minds to synchronic
timescales, one thereby rules out, unnecessarily, cultural practices unfolding over
longer timescales from playing a role in the material constitution of what people
say and do. A core aspect of our argument for ECM is precisely to question this
privileging of the synchronic timescale.
The Pac-Man intuition is false. We suggest by contrast
that extended minds are constituted by temporally unfolding
processes, and thus the Pac-Man intuition provides the wrong
model for thinking about the internalization of cultural forms
of knowledge. Internal models as they are embodied in living
beings are tasked with always having to maintain a grip on the
fluctuations in the dynamics of their local environments. The
fluctuations do not reside or disappear but are constantly forming
and reforming, even if in only slightly different ways. Organisms
must therefore constantly attune their internal dynamics to
the continuously changing dynamics of the environment in
which they are situated. But now it might be objected this
attunement takes place in the here and now. Past learning sets
up dispositions to act in ways that conform with a practice.
Think again of the child learning to do long multiplication. These
dispositions are fully internalized. Everything that is required for
the disposition to be realized in action happens synchronically
in interaction with the environment and with other people, such
as teachers. But to say that a disposition is internalized is not
at all the same as saying that what people know when they
take part in cultural practices is fully internalized. Thus, one
can think of the enactment of cultural practices as happening
synchronically without relying on the Pac-Man intuition to
account for cultural learning.6
In reply, we suggest that this synchronic account of the
enactment of cultural practices misses an important feature
of situated action. It misses how the person’s dispositions are
constrained by rules, norms, principles, and standards that
operate at the scale of the cultural practice. Situated action is
constituted by processes that unfold over two timescales. First,
there is the timescale of the cycles of perception and action that
couple the agent to the environment as in the classic example
of using pen and paper to do mental arithmetic. Cycles of
perception and action unfold over time and thus cannot be
synchronically constituted at a time t. As dynamical processes,
they are diachronically constituted. Second, there is the slower
timescale of the cultural practices the child is initiated into in
learning to do long multiplication. The dispositions the child
puts into action in the here and now are constrained by what
people have done over the longer period of time during which the
practice of doing multiplication has taken shape and developed.
It is these timescales that get out of sync with each other in
cases of phenomenal attunement as was argued at the end of the
previous section. The expectations that are formative for Eva due
to her growing up in Poland do not align with those that are
operative in her new home of Vancouver. Thus, the expectations
that shape her perception and action are out of step with those of
her surroundings.
One can think of this entanglement of the slower and faster
timescales by comparison with the dynamics of self-organizing
systems—disordered systems in which global order can arise
under the influence of the system’s own dynamics. We observe
the emergence of global order in such systems when a control
parameter reaches a critical value that makes possible new
forms of organization. Consider, for instance, the example of the
6Our thanks to the reviewer for pressing this objection.
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Bénard effect from non-equilibrium fluid dynamics. A Bénard or
convection roll forms when a fluid (for example, oil) is heated
from below. The temperature difference between the surface
and the bottom of the fluid is the control parameter. Once this
temperature gradient reaches a critical value with more energy
being introduced into the fluid than can be dissipated, the fluid
becomes unstable. This instability leads to the formation of
rolling, convection patterns in the oil. These rolling patterns
are macroscopic states of the fluid that slowly form in the
oil as it is heated. Such a macroscopic state is formed by
the molecules of which the oil is composed. Thus, there is a
constraint that runs from the micro- to the macro-scale. But
crucially, the constraints also run in the other direction from the
macro- to the micro-scale. When the order parameter reaches
a critical value, the system enters an unstable state that allows
for the convection rolls to arise. The dynamics evolving over
longer timescales—the temperature gradient over the ensemble—
entrains the dynamics evolving over shorter timescales—the
molecules and the dissipation of energy by the fluid.
We are suggesting just the same circular causal dynamic
obtains in the case of situated action. The cycles of perception and
action that form over relatively short timescales can be compared
to the microscopic interactions that take place in the fluid when
it is heated. We are suggesting that the rules, principles, and
standards—the patterns of cultural practice—can be thought of as
macroscopic-order parameters that evolve over longer timescales.
These patterns of practice as order parameters form out of the
interactions of individuals over time. But crucially, they also
entrain what individuals do over faster timescales. The cycles of
perception and action that couple the individual to the cultural
environment and the patterns of practice that are up and running
in the cultural environment mutually constrain each other. They
form a circular causal relationship.
To attempt to account for situated action synchronically,
just in terms of what happens here and now, is mistaken on
two grounds. It ignores how the coupling of the agent to the
environment in perception and action is a dynamic process that
unfolds over multiple interacting timescales. Second, it abstracts
away from the wider pattern of practice that is a constraint
on the situated actions people perform over shorter timescales.
The cultural “training wheels” cannot, always and necessarily,
be dispensed with as the Pac-Man intuition implies. This is
to assume, as Hurley (2010) has pointed out, “that extended
tuning and maintenance processes” are no part of the sought-for
explanation of the workings of the mind (Hurley, 2010, p. 142).
We’ve argued against such an assumption. Once the Pac-Man
intuition is rejected, however, we will need a different account
of constitution from the one that assumes the mind can be




To introduce and develop the distinction between synchronic
and diachronic constitution, a useful starting point is to get clear
about the notion of a metaphysical grounding relation, of which
the concept of constitution is one example. What characterizes a
metaphysical grounding relation is the idea that for a relation,
R, to qualify as a metaphysical grounding relation, R must
express the form “X (or the Xs) metaphysically determines Y,”
when it is by virtue of X (or the Xs) that Y exists. Thus, in
the context of our paper, Y is the experience of phenomenal
attunement or its absence in cases of culture shock. We have been
arguing that phenomenal attunement is constituted by cycles of
perception and action that couple the perceiver to their local
cultural environment. Thus, we are claiming that it is by virtue of
the person’s coupling to the cultural environment that the person
has an experience of phenomenal attunement.
This by-virtue-of relation is often specified as a species of
determination (cf. Kim, 1990; Shapiro, 2004; Polger, 2010).
Different relations—such as composition, realization, and
supervenience—have also been used in philosophy to express the
view that Y exists by virtue of X (Kim, 1998; Bennett, 2011).
It is widely agreed that a necessary condition for X (or the
Xs) to constitute Y is that the relation of constitution that holds
between X (or the Xs) and Y is a synchronic one-to-one, or many-
to-one, relation of determination between spatially and materially
co-located objects (or processes) of different kinds. A central
reason for conceiving of constitution as a synchronic dependence
relation is nicely articulated by Bennett: “building [grounding]
relations do not unfold over time . . . . Causation, in contrast, is
paradigmatically diachronic, and that idea is frequently invoked
to distinguish causation from relations such as composition,
constitution, supervenience . . . ” (Bennett, 2011, pp. 93–94). The
assumption that constitution must be a synchronic dependence
relation is engrained in the very manner in which this grounding
relation is analyzed. For example, it is a standard assumption
on the part of constitution theorists that constitution requires
spatial and material coincidence—X constitutes Y at t only if X
and Y have the same spatial location at a particular time t and
share the same material parts at that specific time t. It is thus
presupposed that the constitution relation holds instantaneously
between X (or the Xs) and Y and therefore cannot be a
temporally unfolding relation. Causation, by contrast, may be
said to hold between independent events or processes, in the
sense that depending on the time interval between cause and
effect, it is prima facie possible to think of cause as preceding
its effect in time thus as occurring non-simultaneously. The
standard formulation of constitution is thus that constitution is
a synchronic relation of dependence.
It is not difficult to provide textual evidence for the claim that
EM is typically taken to be a thesis about the constitution of
minds that assumes this standard formulation of constitution (or,
some other kind of metaphysical grounding relation):
EM is a claim about the composition or constitution of (some)
mental processes (Rowlands, 2009, p. 54; italics added).
What is at issue, as far as the claims about cognitive extension are
concerned, is simply which bits of the world make true (by serving as
the local mechanistic supervenience base for) certain claims about a
subject’s here-and-now mental states or cognitive processing (Clark,
2008, p. 118; italics added).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 August 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1966
fpsyg-11-01966 August 19, 2020 Time: 20:13 # 8
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein Attuning to the World
Causal dependency of mentality on external factors—even when
that causal dependency is of the “necessary” kind [. . .]—is simply
not enough for genuine cognitive extension. What is needed is
constitutive dependence of mentality on external factors, the sort
of dependence indicated by talk of the beyond-the-skin factors
themselves rightly being accorded fully paid-up cognitive status
(Wheeler, 2010, p. 246; italics added).
As a final example consider how Shapiro characterizes the
difference between causation and constitution: “[If] C is a
constituent of an event or process P, C exists where and when
that event or process exists. Thus, for some process P, if C takes
place prior to P’s occurrence [. . .], or if C takes place apart from
P’s occurrence [. . .], then C is not a constituent of P” (Shapiro,
2011, p. 160).
The metaphysics of the extended mind has thus taken
for granted that constitution is a synchronic relation of
determination. But is this assumption warranted? Synchronic
relations are not well suited for understanding dynamical
processes or their nested or hierarchical organization. But
candidates for cases of extended cognition typically involve
reciprocal coupling of the agent and its environment. More
formally, the equations describing the behavior of the agent
over time cannot be solved independently of the equations
describing the environment and vice versa (Lamb and Chemero,
2018). The variables in the respective equations describe how the
components of the agent and environment change in relation to
each other. The equations describing change in the environment
contain variables whose values correspond to changes in the
agent. Conversely the equations describing change in the agent
contain variables whose values correspond to changes in the
environment (Anderson et al., 2012). The state changes of the
agent will be dampened and amplified by state changes in the
environment and vice versa. The solution to these equations is
thus interdependent.
Diachronic constitution captures the basic idea that for a
process to be what it is, it must unfold over time. In other
words, there is no such thing as a process at an instant or
synchronic point in time. For example, one often reads that
water is constituted by or composed of H20. This assumption
is a practical assumption to make, in science as in everyday
life. But it should not be taken as evidence for the further
claim that water is constituted by H20 at a synchronic point
in time. Instead water is constituted by “oxygen and hydrogen
in various polymeric forms, such as (H2O)2, (H2O)3, and so
on, that are constantly forming, dissipating, and reforming over
short time periods in such a way as to give rise to the familiar
properties of the macroscopic kind water” (Ladyman and Ross,
2007, p. 21; italics added). Hence, it makes “no sense to imagine
it [water] having its familiar properties synchronically” (Ross and
Ladyman, 2010, p. 160). Spivey (2007) makes the exact same point
in his book-length treatment of cognitive processes and their
underlying mechanisms.
We suggest that conceiving of constitution as a diachronic
relation that unfolds over time makes a better fit with the
extended mind in which a person’s mental states form in the
dynamic coupling of the agent with its surroundings. Diachronic
constitution questions a basic assumption of synchronic
constitution that ultimate causes must be treated as wholly
distinct from proximate constituents. For example, we can ask
why birds migrate, and we can ask how they migrate. The
former question can be answered by reference to the evolutionary
and developmental history of birds. The latter how-question is
answered by reference to muscle mass, morphology, and so on,
at a specific point in time.7 So there is a clear temporal difference
between these two forms of explanation: the ultimate explanation
is a diachronic mode of explanation; whereas the proximate
explanation, it might be thought, is a type of synchronic
explanation. In other words, proximate how-explanations are
mechanistic and immediate, while ultimate why-explanations
are causal and historical. Diachronic constitution implies that
the choice between ultimate and proximate explanations is
sometimes a false choice. In the case of dynamical phenomena,
proximate explanations will often include ultimate causes. The
constitutive basis of a dynamical process or event will include
both proximate mechanisms and processes unfolding over longer
timescales (Figure 1).
Our claim that diachronic constitution integrates ultimate
and proximate causes seems to obscure the distinction between
causation and constitution. Must there always be a distinct way
of identifying causes and constituents? We think not. A common
strategy by which to identify constituents for specific phenomena
is by determining what plays the most salient causal role(s)
with regards to the constitution of some phenomenon. So the
relevant distinction is not between causation and constitution,
per se; rather, it is between mere causes and constituent causes
(Figure 1B). Diachronic constitution as an account of the
constitution of dynamic phenomena will include ultimate causes
among its constituent causes.8
We conclude then that conceiving of constitution in
diachronic terms provides the best metaphysical tools for
understanding the kind of temporally nested structure that
dynamical systems and processes exhibit (c.f. Kirchhoff, 2015a,c).
Extended cognitive processes are constituted by many different
subprocesses, each of which unfolds continuously over time
exhibiting its own rate of change, rhythm and duration. Each
process will be both influencing, and influenced by, the other
subprocesses of which it is composed (van Gelder and Port, 1995).
The constituent subprocesses may partially overlap in time but
in order to contribute to the constitution of a system S it is not
necessary that their existence entirely overlaps with that of S. The
subprocesses that make up the agent-environment system do so
over a temporally extended interval, and not at discrete instants
7Note that even answering this how-question presupposes a diachronic notion
of constitution, for the processes involved in enabling flight are themselves
temporally extended processes. To say that a system is in some particular state X at
a particular point in time is to say that the average of the system’s states during that
period of time was X (see Spivey, 2007, for discussion). Thus, we do not agree that
how-explanations must always posit mechanisms whose workings are synchronic.
We are suggesting that such an assumption does not hold in the case of dynamical
phenomena.
8One might worry that our account inherits the problem of how to delineate
between mere ultimate causes and ultimate causes as constituent causes. We
return to this worry below in section “Wide and Diachronic Constitution: Two
Conceptual Flips.”
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FIGURE 1 | In panel (A), we depict the standard way of casting the difference
between causation (ultimate causes) and constitution (proximate
mechanisms), where ultimate causes influence but do not constitute the
phenomenon of interest. Panel (B) illustrates the notion of diachronic
constitution, where the constituent causes for some phenomenon include
ultimate and proximate causes over time, but not mere (background) causes.
in a stepwise and linear manner. In the remainder of our paper
we make use of the notion of diachronic constitution to develop




Consider the following twin case involving Eva and Eva∗. Eva
and Eva∗ are neural duplicates. Eva, situated in Vancouver, is
experiencing culture shock. Given that Eva∗ shares an identical
neural profile with Eva, does it follow that she must also
experience culture shock? We agree with Hurley (2010) that if
a brain is not hooked up and plugged into an environment just
like mine, it will not always be possible for this brain to play its
role in generating experiences just like mine (c.f. Nöe, 2006). It
is not always possible to “unplug” the internal neural factors that
bring about experiences from the environment and “replug” them
into a different environment without this replugging changing
the functioning of the internal neural factors (Hurley, 2010).
We’ll argue that phenomenal attunement counts as a case in
which pluggability fails. For Eva and Eva∗ to be neural duplicates
they must also be environmental duplicates. It is not their
being neural duplicates that minimally suffices to make them
phenomenal duplicates.9 The minimally sufficient conditions for
Eva and Eva∗ to be phenomenal duplicates will include the
cultural environment they couple to in perception and action and
the normative expectations that operate this environment. This
is because it is the coupling of Eva to the cultural environment
and the role of culture-specific expectations in mediating this
coupling that constitute her experience of culture shock. The
9The cognitive neuroscientist Georg Northoff (2019) would seem to agree. He
argues that “what happens beyond the boundaries of our brain” in the body and in
the surrounding environment is partially constitutive of consciousness (Northoff,
2019, p. 12). The brain’s intrinsic dynamics should, he suggests, be thought of as
“neuro-ecological” —that is to say, as “deeply embedded within and dependent
upon the world” (Northoff, 2019, p. 7). We take this concept to be another way
of talking about the unpluggability of the brain from the body and the rest of the
world.
mere notion that Eva and Eva∗ are neural duplicates is not by
itself sufficient to make them phenomenal duplicates. To share
an experience of phenomenal lack of attunement, they must be
duplicate extended dynamic singularities.
To see this last point, imagine a scenario in which Eva
and Eva∗ share identical neural states. They are synchronically
identical in terms of the configuration of their brains. Eva,
however, is living in her home country, Poland, and Eva∗ has
left to take up a new life in Vancouver. Note that it would be
Eva∗, and not Eva, who experiences culture shock. What can we
appeal to for an explanation of this difference in experience? The
key difference is Eva’s coupling to her local cultural environment.
It is the coupling that is being intervened in in this scenario.
Thus, it is Eva’s relation to her cultural environment that
makes the real difference in accounting for why Eva and Eva∗
could be neural duplicates and still differ in their phenomenal
experience. Eva∗ experiences a lack of attunement with her
cultural surroundings because the expectations that underlie her
perception and action do not match those that are operative in
her local cultural environment.
We take this thought experiment to show that pluggability
fails at least for the case of phenomenal attunement. One cannot
hold the internal states of the agent constant while varying the
external states of the environments without this affecting whether
a subject experiences phenomenal attunement. Eva is, in other
words, nothing like Pac-Man. One cannot simply screen-off as
background conditions, her ongoing coupling to her cultural
environment since this coupling is constitutive of her conscious
experience of phenomenal lack of attunement. The idea that Eva
can be unplugged from her surroundings so long as her internal
states are kept the same relies on the idea that Eva’s experience is
synchronically constituted. So long as you take two individuals
who are internally the same at a given instant, this should
necessitate that the individuals are also phenomenally identical.
We take the failure of pluggability for the case of phenomenal
attunement to follow from the diachronic constitution of
phenomenal attunement. It is because phenomenal attunement
is constituted by dynamical processes that interact over multiple
timescales that individuals cannot simply be unplugged from one
environment and plugged into another without this altering their
experience of phenomenal attunement.
At this stage we anticipate some readers will raise the following
worry: you state that it is not always possible to “unplug” the
internal from the external without this having some non-trivial
effect on phenomenal experience. But does the brain and its
role in constituting consciousness not lend itself to this kind of
“unplugging”? Think about cases such as dreaming, imagining,
and mind wandering, in which the conscious mind is unplugged
from the world, often allowing the brain to produce conscious
states that are phenomenologically similar if not identical to those
a subject enjoys when plugged into the world. We will call this
the “internal fantasy objection” since it presses us to consider
phenomenological similarities between perceptual experience
and inner fantasies like dreaming and day-dreaming. If a subject
can undergo a phenomenologically identical experience while
being uncoupled from the world, doesn’t this undermine our
claim that coupling is what constitutes phenomenal attunement?
Couldn’t Eva dream she is back in Poland enjoying an experience
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of phenomenal attunement with her surroundings, while she is
actually asleep in her bed in Vancouver?
Again this objection assumes Eva’s phenomenologically
identical dream experience of attunement is the result of the
brain states she undergoes at a moment in time. It assumes we
can bracket Eva’s history of coupling to her environment and
consider only what is happening in her brain at the moment she
is dreaming as constitutive of her experience, treating everything
else as a background condition. We suggest that dreaming and
waking experiences can be phenomenologically indistinguishable
because the neural processes that are necessary for waking
experience are recycled in sleep. In online perceptual experience
internal (brain) and external (world) states are tightly coupled
to one another via sensory and active states (Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein, 2019a,b). Break the coupling and you break the
possibility for the system in question to constitute conscious
experience of phenomenal attunement. Online experience is the
result of a dynamical coupling of perceiver and environment that
unfolds over time. In fully offline, decoupled cases of experience,
such as in dreaming or mind-wandering, internal and external
states are not coupled in the same way. But offline cases of
conscious experience, insofar as they recycle online perceptual
experience, remain indirectly constitutively dependent on a
history of coupling. Offline experiences inherit this constitutive
dependence on coupling from online experience insofar as they
are the result of recycling online experiences. Perhaps it will
be objected that the indirect constitutive dependence of dream
experience on coupling is really just a causal dependence. But
again, this response assumes that we can take the neural processes
that are constitutive of dream experience at a moment in time
and bracket the longer history of coupling with the environment.
We’ve been arguing that such an assumption is false at least for
the case of phenomenal attunement.10
The ever persistent internalist skeptic will no doubt continue
to insist on the intuition that Eva∗ can have the same phenomenal
experience as Eva, whatever differences there might be between
their respective environments. The modal intuition is familiar:
once we fix the neural contribution to consciousness, variation
in the environment of the individual is beside the point. The
phenomenal experience of Eva and Eva∗ is fully metaphysically
determined by whatever is taking place within their brains.
Eva∗ could just as well be a disembodied brain floating about
in space (Block, 2005). All that matters when it comes to her
phenomenal experience is the configuration of neural activity in
her brain. We will call this the “free-floating brain” objection.
We do not pretend to know what would happen in such remote
possible worlds in which disembodied brains can suddenly spring
into existence. There may be, at the outer limits of this modal
intuition, a possible world where Eva and Eva∗ could share
the same phenomenal experience despite living in different
environments. What is of interest to us are possible worlds closer
to home. We therefore suggest that the modal intuition that
stands behind the free-floating brain objection is quite beside the
point when it comes to the case of culture shock.




Internalist skeptics do not tire easily. We predict that they will
continue to object, and most likely along quite familiar lines. It
is something of a truism, they will insist, that cognitive activity
(including conscious activity) is causally influenced by neural
and non-neural (bodily, worldly) factors. But they will ask: How
would we go about distinguishing non-neural bodily and worldly
elements that are partially constitutive of the mind from such
elements that merely causal influences on mental processes?
The causal-constitutive distinction has long dominated the
debate about the extended mind (Adams and Aizawa, 2001,
Adams and Aizawa, 2008; Rupert, 2004; Clark, 2008; Menary,
2010; Kirchhoff, 2015b; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019a). It
will likely be objected that as defenders of ECM we are
guilty of mistaking the causal dependence of phenomenal
attunement on coupling with the cultural environment for the
partial constitution of conscious experience by coupling with
the cultural environment. Our opponents will assert that the
proximal mechanisms internal to Eva’s brain are minimally
sufficient for her conscious experience. Let us stipulate that the
existence of a population of neurons N is minimally sufficient
for a conscious experience C if the activation of N is all that is
required for the generation of C. Other neural activity may be
causally necessary for the subject to come to instantiate N, but
once the subject is in neural state N, no other neural activity in
addition to N is required for the subject to experience C (Hohwy
and Bayne, 2015, p. 159).11 Our opponents will likely agree that
the occurrence of N causally depends on a long prior history
of engagement in cultural practices. Still they will say we must
distinguish the proximate cause of Eva’s experience in the here
and now—the configuration of neural states N that constitute the
minimal sufficient condition for Eva’s experience—from whatever
forms a part of the ultimate explanation for why Eva experiences
what she does. It is only the proximate mechanisms that qualify
as the realizers of her experience. The rest is a part of the ultimate
explanation of why she has the experience she does. To insist
otherwise is to commit the causal-constitutive fallacy.
This by now overly familiar line of argument is, in our view,
premised on a number of problematic and mistaken assumptions.
First, defenders of EM, most notably Clark and Chalmers (1998;
but see also Wheeler, 2015), begin with the assumption that the
basic ontological profile of the mind is a brainbound profile
with the mind occasionally leaking out into the world. At least
they assume that the brain plays a privileged role in constituting
the mind. The paradigm of the mental is what goes on inside
the head of individuals. The famous parity principle assesses
11Notice that this characterization of minimal neural sufficiency is very general.
It is neutral on debates within the neuroscience of consciousness about the best
theory of consciousness, such as the debate between the information integration
theory of Tononi and colleagues, the global workspace theory of Baars and
Dehaene, or the recurrent processing theory of Lamme and colleagues, to mention
a few candidates. Our discussion need not take a stand on which of these theories
is correct since we are concerned with the more general question of the correctness
of the neural sufficiency claim.
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the putative cognitive contribution of some external element by
comparison with cognitive processes that take place internally
inside of an individual’s head.12 This way of framing EM, however,
concedes too much to the internalist, brainbound view of the
mind. It assumes that the processes that take place inside
of the brains of individuals are where constitutive causes are
typically to be found. The external environment is populated with
merely supporting causes, which may, under the right conditions,
become constituent parts of a person’s mental states. This is
to accept that the environment can basically be screened-off
from constitutive questions about the mind by processes that are
internal to individuals.13
Our argument for ECM does not rest on such an internalist
starting point. As we said at the outset of this paper, we consider
that mentality is first and foremost constituted by bouts of
temporally extended engagement with the environment. The vast
majority of “what humans do and experience is best understood
by appealing to dynamically unfolding, situated embodied
interactions and engagements with worldly offerings” (Hutto
et al., 2014, p. 1). One cannot uncouple the cognitive agent from
its cultural, developmental, and historical environment because
much of what the agent does constitutively depends on his or her
taking part in cultural practices. Our internalist opponents claim
that external elements can only play supportive causal roles, but
they do so because they start from the assumption that minds
are typically housed inside of the skin and skull of individuals
and only occasionally if ever have recourse to go out into the
world. This is an assumption that internalists ironically share
with first-wave parity-based arguments for the extended mind.
We, by contrast, take this assumption to be precisely what EM
ought to challenge.
The EM debate has up until now largely played out around
the question of how to delineate the boundaries of mind.
Philosophers have wondered how to settle the question of where
the mind stops and the rest of the non-mental world begins,
and the debate has ended up being all about “location, location,
(and only) location” (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 10). The argument about
the boundaries of the mind is, however, not only about the
spatial location of the mind, and whether the constituents or
material realizers of a given class of mental states are sometimes
wide or always narrow. We have been making an argument for
EM on temporal grounds because we take the constitution of
mind to be diachronic, not synchronic. The focus on location
has led to a reification of the proximate-ultimate distinction.
12For example, in their discussion of Otto, Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue
that the inscriptions in Otto’s notebook are part and parcel of Otto’s mind
conditioned on an appeal to the function of brain-based biological memory. In a
different example also considered by Clark and Chalmers (1998), the comparison
is hypothetical, in the consideration of different instantiations of the function of
a zoid-rotator in the game of Tetris. In both scenarios, however, it is the internal
that is paraded as the benchmark for the mental. With this starting point in place,
the real business of EM is to test whether specific external elements in the world
play comparable or equivalent functional roles to those identified inside the head.
If yes, then the external elements in question should fall within the confines of the
mind.
13The notion of “screening-off” is standard in discussions of mental causation. As
we pointed out in section “Synchronic and Diachronic Constitution,” it is common
procedure to look for causes that play the most salient role in the production of
some phenomenon when identifying constituents of such a phenomenon.
Once we think of mind as diachronically constituted, a strict
choice between proximate and ultimate explanation is revealed
to be a false choice. There are no fixed and sharp boundaries
between proximate and ultimate causes. Cultural practices and
biological processes are best conceptualized as elements of
a single dynamical network (cf. Hurley, 1998; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein, 2019a).
Consider once more the case of Eva and Eva∗. We argued
that the main difference that determines why Eva∗ does, but
Eva does not, experience culture shock is the coupling of the
twins to the cultural environment. The constitution of Eva’s
conscious experience of culture shock is not wholly determined
by her properties as a biological individual at a given snapshot
moment in time. It is the dynamics of her coupling with her
cultural environment that pick out the constituents that make
up the minimally sufficient constitutive basis of her experience of
phenomenal lack of attunement characteristic of culture shock.
Perception and action couple Eva to her cultural environment,
but this coupling unfolds over time. The coupling is in turn
constrained by patterns of practice that also unfold over longer
periods of time. It is the meeting up of these temporally extended
processes that constitutes the conditions under which Eva, but
not Eva∗, experiences culture shock. So even when attempting
to identify the minimally sufficient constitutive basis for certain
kinds of conscious experience, one cannot simply separate the
individual from her history. Constitution is not only wide; it is
also diachronic.
The standard framing of the causal-constitutive distinction
rests on a particular conception of the organism-environment
relation; a conception according to which the world is “outside”
or “external” to the organism and causes changes in its
internal states. We have been arguing for ECM based upon the
dynamics of the person’s coupling with her cultural environment
in perception and action. The person is situated within a
larger dynamical process of the cultural practices she takes
part in (Kirchhoff et al., 2018). Culture is not something
external to the individual in which the individual is sometimes
causally embedded. Both the individual agent and the cultural
environment form out of a nesting of dynamical networks,
including networks that form in the patterns of activities
people engage in over long periods of time as members of
cultural practices. The cultural environment is not outside of the
individual. The individual is situated in a cultural environment
in a way that calls into question any neat distinction between
inside and outside.
Even if the reader agrees with us on all of these points, she
might still raise the following objection: if cultural practices,
unfolding over longer than synchronic timescales, are partly
constitutive of conscious experience, then there is no stopping
the rampant and out of control expansion of the mind into the
world. This is the well known cognitive bloat objection to EM
(cf. Sprevak, 2009; Rowlands, 2010). The arguments of this paper
provide us with resources for replying to this worry.
Consider again our twin case: Eva and Eva∗ are in identical
neural states, but Eva is living in her home country, Poland,
while Eva∗ has left to take up her new life in Vancouver. Eva∗,
but not Eva, experiences culture shock. We have claimed the
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key difference is coupling to the cultural environment. Our
appeal to an account that makes a difference in determining
and differentiating constitutive causes from mere background
causes allows us to sidestep the cognitive bloat objection. We
have argued that the phenomenology of culture shock can be
formalized as the Kullback–Leibler divergence between prior
expectations (P∗) and cultural practices (Po) generating sensory
states, Cexp = DKL [P∗ || Po], such that high misalignment (i.e.,
high uncertainty) between P∗ and Po results in experiences of
alienation and distress relative to current cultural practices. This
leads to the following scenarios:
Poland: Cexp = DKL [P∗ || Po] = 0. Here Eva’s expectations are
aligned with her cultural world in such a fashion that she does
not experience culture shock.
Vancouver: Cexp = DKL [P∗ || Po] > 0. Here Eva’s expectations
are misaligned with her cultural world in a way that results in
her experiencing culture shock.
Counterfactually, were one to intervene in the cultural
practices in Vancouver, one would expect a minimization in
the divergence between P∗ and Po, with a resulting change in
Eva’s phenomenology given the particular form of the agent-
environment coupling. One might, for instance, point Eva to
the district in Vancouver where a community of Polish emigres
have made their home. Conversely, intervening in P∗ would likely
lead to similar results, a reduced sense of distress and alienation.
This provides our argument for ECM with a methodology for
identifying relevant (i.e., constitutive) causes, demarcating these
from mere background causes such as oxygen in the atmosphere,
given that the latter would at best be an indirect (i.e., background)
cause of the generation of conscious experience. There is
therefore a path by which to argue for ECM that does not lead
to unconstrained spreading consciousness out into the world.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the experience of phenomenal attunement
is constituted by coupling to the cultural environment. A core
structure of a person’s conscious mental life is constituted by
processes that criss-cross the boundary separating the brain
from the body and the rest of the world. We’ve made such an
argument based on the diachronic constitution of phenomenal
attunement. Many hold that the proximate-ultimate distinction
marks a sharp divide between causes that track why a system
does what it does and how a system is able to do what it does.
This distinction is taken by most to represent a division between
diachronic (ultimate) and synchronic (proximate) explanation.
We have argued that this choice between two different modes
of explanation is a false choice. An explanation of phenomenal
attunement needs to embed ultimate causes (cultural practices
and histories of engagement with the world) within a proximate
explanation of conscious experience. This has led us also to call
into question the distinction between causation and constitution
as it is generally deployed in the EM debate, taking steps toward
a diachronic conception of constitution. Diachronic constitution
implies that the agent and the wider cultural environment cannot
be cleanly unplugged from one another in a way that would
allow for a purely neural (synchronic) explanation of phenomenal
attunement. Conscious persons cannot simply throw away
the world and rely wholly on on-board neural resources for
the generation of their conscious experience of being attuned
to the world. Conscious beings cannot be unplugged from
the extended dynamic singularity that forms in the agent’s
coupling with the world because conscious beings are extended
dynamic singularities.
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